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(53) 
EXACERBATING INJUSTICE 
STEPHANOS BIBAS
† 
In response to Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 
1117 (2008). 
 
Josh Bowers’s article Punishing the Innocent
1
 is a terrific contribu-
tion to the plea-bargaining literature.  Bowers, a former public de-
fender, cuts through many of the misguided assumptions that cloud 
thinking about plea bargaining.  For one, he is absolutely right to re-
focus attention away from the few violent felonies to the overwhelm-
ing number of low-level misdemeanors and violations.
2
  The market 
and shadow-of-trial metaphors have some validity for the highest-
stakes cases.
3
  For murders, rapes, and terrorism prosecutions, public 
monitoring and retributive outrage discipline prosecutors, and the 
desire to minimize sentences drives defendants.
4
  But the market or 
shadow-of-trial model has little relevance for low-level crimes, for 
which the desire to get it over with overwhelms the nominal sen-
tences.  As Malcolm Feeley famously argued, the process is the pun-
ishment.
5
 
Another valuable contribution of Bowers’s article is to focus atten-
tion on recidivists.
6
  The spectre that an innocent person like you or 
me might face mistaken conviction haunts many discussions of the in-
nocence problem.  As Bowers notes, this fear is greatly exaggerated.
7
  
Police are unlikely to target and assume the guilt of citizens with clean 
records, and the absence of prior convictions makes it easier for law-
 
 
†
  Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. 
1
Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1117 (2008). 
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 See id. at 1129. 
3
I have made this point elsewhere.  Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the 
Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2491-93 (2004) (noting the pressure that pre-
trial detention places on low-level misdemeanants to plead guilty in exchange for a 
sentence of time served). 
4
See William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow, 117 
HARV. L. REV. 2548, 2563 (2004). 
5
MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT:  HANDLING CASES IN A 
LOWER CRIMINAL COURT (1979). 
6
Bowers, supra note 1, at 1124-32. 
7
Id. at 1124-25 (stating that a wrongful conviction of a “good person” is “the rar-
est type of a rare category”). 
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abiding citizens to speak in their own defense at trial.  Moreover, 
those with clean records have greater incentives to clear their names 
to avoid criminal records in the first place.  But recidivists, as unsavory 
as they are, are much more likely to be swept up in a dragnet of guilt 
by association.  And because they already have criminal records, they 
may be much less reluctant to rack up one more conviction even if it 
is unjustified.  This phenomenon may exacerbate existing race and 
class disparities, as those who are punished once are more likely to be 
the usual suspects. 
Finally, Bowers has a unique take on the puzzling phenomena of 
Alford
8
 and nolo contendere pleas.
9
  I have complained that those 
pleas make it too easy for innocent defendants to plead guilty.
10
  Bow-
ers turns that argument on its head, noting that innocent defendants 
may rationally prefer to plead guilty than stand trial.
11
  While these de-
cisions are not always fully informed and rational,
12
 Bowers is right 
that, even with full information, many innocent recidivists would still 
want to plead guilty. 
Nonetheless, Bowers’s argument rests on a misguided premise.  
He assumes that the job of plea rules and defense lawyers is simply to 
maximize the satisfaction of innocent defendants’ preferences.  That 
is one plausible model of criminal justice, but hardly the only one.  
Lay intuitions recoil at Bowers’s argument, I think, because we think 
the job of the criminal justice system is to do justice.  Of course, as 
Bowers notes, our justice system is tragically flawed, presenting inno-
cent defendants with hard choices.  Bowers and Albert Alschuler 
would say that, for as long as we have a flawed system, the remedy is to 
make it easier for innocent defendants to plead as they wish.
13
 
This narrow utilitarian calculus leaves out several important con-
siderations.  For one, Bowers gives too little weight to public faith and 
 
8
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). 
9
Bowers, supra note 1, at 1165-70. 
10
Stephanos Bibas, Harmonizing Substantive-Criminal-Law Values and Criminal Proce-
dure:  The Case of Alford and Nolo Contendere Pleas, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1361, 1382-86 
(2003). 
11
Bowers, supra note 1, at 1174 n.288. 
12
Bibas, supra note 10, at 1384 (“[I]nnocent defendants who want to enter Alford 
or nolo pleas are likely overestimating their risk of conviction at trial.”). 
13
See Albert W. Alschuler, Straining at Gnats and Swallowing Camels:  The Selective 
Morality of Professor Bibas, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1412, 1424 (2003) (arguing that efforts to 
block Alford pleas would only “increase[] the system’s hypocrisy”); Bowers, supra note 
1, at 1163 (“[T]he impact of permitting innocent defendants to plea bargain is a mere 
drop in a very large and full bucket.”). 
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confidence in the justice system.  True, low-level crimes are not often 
on the public’s radar screen.  And true, some innocent defendants are 
unjustly facing conviction, a cloaked injustice that Bowers would bring 
out into the open.  But formally endorsing and embracing false guilty 
pleas as a legal fiction can only further erode public confidence in 
and the legitimacy of the justice system.  Public legitimacy and trust 
are tied to the public’s perception of the justice system’s substantive 
accuracy and procedural fairness.  Blatantly unjust pleas can only sap 
public faith in and compliance with the law.
14
  A Marxist might per-
versely embrace Bowers’s proposal as a way to foment the revolution-
ary overthrow of the capitalist system by exposing and exacerbating its 
internal contradictions.  But that is not Bowers’s agenda.  Allowing—
indeed, encouraging—the innocent to lie and plead guilty can only 
further erode public confidence. 
Moreover, as I have argued elsewhere, most defendants who balk 
at admitting guilt are not innocent, but guilty criminals in denial.  For 
them, Alford and nolo contendere pleas represent cheap ways out, ac-
cepting punishment while continuing to deny guilt.  When the legal 
system offers these pleas, it facilitates and hardens defendants’ deni-
als.  But admissions of guilt are first steps on the road to reform.  This 
is why Alcoholics Anonymous and similar twelve-step programs re-
quire admitting one’s wrongdoing as a prerequisite for turning over a 
new leaf and moving on.  Pleas that let defendants continue to pro-
claim their innocence may prevent them from entering prison treat-
ment programs, greatly increasing the likelihood of recidivism.  They 
also make it easier for defense lawyers to let denying defendants re-
main in denial, instead of getting to the bottom of guilt or inno-
cence.
15
  Now, it is possible that Bowers’s proposal would break down 
the dam of denial, leading some defendants to mouth their own guilt 
and later come to confess it freely.  But it is at least as likely that many 
guilty defendants would express buyer’s remorse later on, telling 
 
14
See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 94-109, 125-34, 146-47, 161-69, 
178 (1990) (stressing the importance of procedural justice for law’s legitimacy); TOM 
R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW:  ENCOURAGING PUBLIC COOPERATION 
WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS 101-38 (2002) (same); Paul H. Robinson & John M. 
Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 483-85, 488 (1997) (emphasizing the 
importance of substantive just deserts for the criminal law’s credibility, respect, and 
compliance); see also Janice Nadler, Flouting the Law, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1399, 1410-26 
(2005) (finding that stories of unjust laws increased survey subjects’ willingness to flout 
unrelated laws and to nullify as jurors in unrelated criminal cases). 
15
See generally Bibas, supra note 10, at 1393-1406 (arguing that confessions and tri-
als are valuable for guilty defendants). 
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friends and family that their pleas were legal fictions with no truth 
content. 
These continued denials harm not only offenders’ rehabilitation, 
but also victims’ healing.  If defendants who plead guilty can plausibly 
back away from their pleas at any time, victims may never enjoy clo-
sure.  The defendant’s family may more readily accept the defendant’s 
self-serving proclamations of factual innocence in the face of his legal 
plea of guilt.  (I am more skeptical than Bowers that the legal system 
can maintain acoustic separation, proclaiming a defendant’s guilt 
publicly while privately whispering that guilty pleas are mere legal fic-
tions.)  Thus, victims may feel they have to continue to defend them-
selves and their actions from the jeers and criticisms of defendants’ 
friends and family.  Victims want authoritative, final pronouncements 
of guilt or innocence, and only trial verdicts or unequivocal guilty 
pleas can deliver that. 
Another dynamic effect could involve salving the consciences of 
defense lawyers.  Defense lawyers have self-interests in quick pleas, but 
these are balanced by moral and ethical strictures on convicting the 
innocent.  Moral horror at convicting the innocent, reinforced by le-
gal and ethical barriers to doing so, stiffen their spines and steel them 
to do combat.  This adversarial combat may be a public good, as it 
may expose unjust arrests, crooked police informants, testilying, racial 
profiling, and the like.
16
  If we remove the legal and ethical barriers, 
defense lawyers may feel more comfortable allowing and encouraging 
guilty pleas by the innocent.  This may undercut their zeal to vindicate 
them.  The result could be to stifle the exposure of police misconduct 
and similar injustices. 
Most fundamentally, though, Bowers is mistaken to view all of 
criminal justice as a utilitarian calculus.  Convicting the innocent is 
just plain wrong, and making it easier is simply abetting the wrong.  
Bowers would respond that the flaw lies in a justice system that threat-
ens innocents with huge process costs and substantial chances of mis-
taken punishment.  To his mind, fictional guilty pleas are simply the 
 
16
Indeed, one fake-drug scandal involving the Dallas Police Department snared 
many false guilty pleas until pretrial discovery revealed the fake drugs, causing the 
house of cards to collapse.  See Holly Becka & Tim Wyatt, DA Tossing Dozens of Drug 
Cases; Prosecutors Acting Amid Concerns over Fake Evidence, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 
18, 2002, at 1A; Robert Tharp, D.A. Hill Admits Action Too Slow on Fake-Drugs Scandal, 
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 27, 2005, at 6H; Robert Tharp, Drug Cases Marred:  Several 
Arrests Jeopardized by Fake Cocaine, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 1, 2002, at 23A.  While 
these false pleas already happen, Bowers’s proposal could make the problem worse, 
covering up even more police misconduct. 
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least bad way out of a system that will inevitably convict some innocent 
defendants anyway.  But there is a big moral difference between im-
posing process costs on a presumedly innocent defendant and impos-
ing criminal punishment, with all its attendant moral stigma and op-
probrium.  And there is an even bigger deontological moral 
difference between accidentally or even negligently convicting an in-
nocent defendant versus intentionally or knowingly making it easier to 
convict him.  Of course, that is the point of criminal law’s fine mens 
rea gradations.  Intent matters.  And the manifest intent of Bowers’s 
proposal, or at least the way the public would see it, is that we simply 
don’t care. 
The massive flaws in our criminal justice system are indeed frus-
trating.  It is awfully tempting to give in to the punishment assembly 
line, to make it speedier and more efficient and surrender any pre-
tense of doing justice.  But our conscience cannot brook that.  We 
must fight; we must continue to proclaim our commitment to exoner-
ating the innocent, however inconsistent we are in pursuing that in 
practice.  We remain prey to charges of pious hypocrisy, but at least we 
keep the ideal as our lodestar.  Otherwise, we might as well surrender 
the powerful symbolism of criminal Justice, wearing her blindfold, 
scales, and all.  To do so would be not only a social disaster, but a 
moral one as well. 
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